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Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role in the international 
transfer of  both capital and technology and has a significant impact on the 
pattern of international trade. The most recent detailed government survey of 
U.S. direct investment abroad found that in 1989 the foreign affiliates of U.S. 
multinational corporations had assets of more than $1.2 trillion, approximately 
25 percent of U.S. gross domestic product in that year. 
Companies make direct investments abroad by  acquiring existing business 
assets of foreign companies, by starting new businesses with “green field” in- 
vestments in plant and equipment, and by increasing their investments in for- 
eign businesses that they already own. These foreign investments can be either 
wholly owned by the parent company or owned jointly with foreign partners.’ 
The heterogeneity of  FDI reflects the diversity of  motives for making such 
investments.2  At one extreme, some FDI (like the purchase of commercial real 
estate) is not fundamentally different from portfolio investment and the moti- 
vation is the standard desire to diversify portfolio assets. A more traditional 
motivation for FDI is to take advantage of low-cost labor or proximity to raw 
materials. The primary reason is probably to maintain or increase foreign sales 
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1. The minimum extent of the parent company’s ownership share required to make an investment 
qualify as “direct” rather than portfolio investment depends on the particular definition of FDI. 
The common halance-of-payments definition of FDI  is based on ownership of at least 10 percent 
of the equity in the foreign business. For some purposes, it is more sensible to concentrate on 
businesses where the parent has a majority ownership interest. 
2. See Froot (1993) and Graham and Krugman (1991), and the references cited in those books, 
for a general discussion of FDI  with particular reference to the United States. 
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and market share. Thus, manufacturing companies that make products for in- 
dustrial customers invest abroad in order to have closer working relations with 
customers,  especially  when  their products  must be  specifically  designed  or 
modified for their customers. Many service companies must invest abroad if 
they want to provide services to those local markets. And some manufacturers 
acquire foreign firms in order to gain entry into local markets. 
Government policies significantly  influence the pattern of FDI, sometimes 
intentionally and sometimes inadvertently. Some governments require local in- 
vestment (to create industrial jobs or achieve technology transfers) as a condi- 
tion of access to government procurement or licensing. Other governments use 
favorable tax and credit policies to attract foreign investment. In contrast, some 
governments  (e.g., Japan) are notorious for the regulatory barriers that deter 
inbound FDI. 
The effects of government policies on FDI are not always intended, but may 
be  the inadvertent byproducts  of  policies  designed to serve other purposes. 
Tariffs and other trade barriers intended to protect domestic producers induce 
inbound FDI. The taxation of multinational companies can encourage or im- 
pede both inbound and outbound FDI. 
There has been a substantial public policy debate about the effects of  in- 
bound and outbound FDI on the domestic e~onomy.~  Much of the public con- 
cern is stated in terms of the effect of FDI on employment, with opponents of 
outbound FDI arguing that such FDI “takes production abroad’ and reduces 
employment at home, while proponents of outbound FDI counter that such 
FDI creates markets for U.S. exports to affiliates and through affiliates to for- 
eign buyers.  Economists recognize that this is a misplaced concern because 
the American labor market works well in assuring that all who want jobs at 
wages that reflect their skills can find work within a relatively short period of 
time. As Graham and Krugman emphasize: “The net impact of  FDI on US. 
employment is approximately zero, and the truth of this assertion has nothing 
to do with job gains and losses at the industry level” (Graham and Krugman 
1991,49). Studies that calculate the numbers of jobs “lost” because particular 
firms  shift  activity  abroad  (e.g.,  Bergsten  et al.  1978; Hufbauer  and Adler 
1968) do not take into account the absorption of  those American workers by 
other firms and industries. 
A related  and more plausible  concern  is often expressed in  terms of  the 
impact of FDI on the “quality” of jobs. The worry is that although the forces 
of  supply and demand maintain total employment, the shift of  investment to 
foreign countries causes a substitution in the United States of low-wage jobs 
for the higher-wage manufacturing jobs that have gone abroad. As a general 
proposition, this is again incorrect.  In a well-functioning  labor market  like 
ours, wages reflect the skills of the workers and are therefore not affected by 
3. See, e.g., the  discussions  in  Bergsten,  Horst, and Moran  (1978),  Graham  and  Krugman 
(1991). and Hufbauer and Adler (1968). 45  Outbound FDI and Domestic Capital 
the entry or exit of individual firms. There are some ways, however, in which 
foreign investment could affect wages. Market imperfections that permit work- 
ers in some industries to be paid substantially more than individuals with simi- 
lar skills in other industries (e.g., union power or the monopoly power of firms 
that share their monopoly profits with employees) do provide a mechanism by 
which the mix of firms can affect the distribution of wages. In addition, even 
without such market imperfections, FDI can affect the quality of jobs if it alters 
the marginal product of labor. This can happen if  FDI changes the domestic 
capital stock. It can also happen if FDI increases or decreases the kinds of jobs 
that are more likely to involve substantial on-the-job training. Training reflects 
the mix of industries and may be more important in capital-intensive industries 
than in other ind~stries.~ 
This leads naturally to two questions about the effect of FDI on the capital 
stocks of  both the parent and host countries. First, what impact does an in- 
crease in the assets of foreign affiliates have on the parent country’s capital 
stock? Second, what impact does an inflow of FDI have on the host country’s 
capital stock? The answers to these questions may well depend on the form of 
the FDI and on the reason for the particular inflow or outflow of such invest- 
ment.5  Although the available data do not permit such a disaggregated analysis, 
it is possible to assess the extent to which countries that experience sustained 
high rates of inbound or outbound FDI have higher or lower levels of domestic 
investment than would otherwise be expected. The current study focuses on 
estimating the extent to which outbound FDI reduces domestic investment in 
the parent country. 
Previous studies of this question have been microeconomic partial equilib- 
rium analyses that have asked whether firms that invest more abroad reduce 
their investment at home.6  Although these studies can shed interesting light on 
the behavior of multinational companies, they do not indicate the net effect on 
the economy as a whole when individual firms increase their outbound FDI. 
When firms increase their overseas investment, the funds that they might other- 
wise have used in the United  States might instead  finance greater domestic 
investment by others, leaving both the aggregate capital outflow and the level 
of domestic investment unchanged. Alternatively, the process of outbound FDI 
might increase the aggregate net capital outflow and therefore reduce total do- 
4. For an extensive discussion of the impact of  outbound FDI  on employment in the United 
States, see Lipsey (chap.  1, this volume). Lipsey concludes that the effect of increased outbound 
FDI on the domestic employment by  multinational companies is probably slightly positive (as 
outbound FDI increases exports) and that the mix  of  domestic jobs shifts toward  more higher- 
paying technical and managerial positions. 
5. Since FDI is an endogenous variable in the complex system of trade and capital flows, it 
would in principle be desirable to estimate a more fully articulated structural model in which one 
can assess the extent to which changes in exogenous variables that alter FDI  influence domestic 
investment through this route. I return to this issue in section 2.4 below. 
6. These studies include Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988), Lipsey and Weiss (1984), 
Severn (1972), and Stevens (1969). 46  Martin Feldstein 
mestic investment. Resolving the policy debate about the effect of FDI on do- 
mestic investment requires resolving this macroeconomic general equilibrium 
issue. 
This paper presents information  on the general equilibrium effect of  FDI 
based on aggregate evidence about investment flows in the OECD countries. 
The analysis focuses on the effect of outbound FDI and implies that such in- 
vestment does reduce domestic investment but that each dollar of  assets in 
foreign affiliates reduces the domestic capital stock by substantially less than 
a dollar. The best  summary of the evidence is that each dollar of  assets in 
foreign  affiliates reduces the domestic capital  stock by  between  20 and 40 
cents. 
Before looking at the basis for these conclusions, it is useful to begin by 
considering several alternative concepts of FDI and the relevant magnitude of 
each for the United States. This is the subject of  section 2.1. Section 2.2 dis- 
cusses alternative theories of how outbound FDI could affect the domestic cap- 
ital stock. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present investment equations that are estimated 
using the OECD data. The implications of this for the displacement question 
are discussed in the final section. The appendix presents the basic data used in 
sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
2.1  Three Concepts of  FDI 
Several alternative concepts of the stock of FDI are possible. A very narrow 
definition measures the stock of FDI as the accumulated cross-border flow of 
equity and debt from the parent company to its foreign subsidiary. The parent 
company may,  however, have control over a much larger volume of foreign 
assets, including those financed by retained earnings and by  borrowing from 
foreign and other domestic creditors. 
This section starts with the narrowest definition of outbound FDI and then 
presents a series of building blocks that can be used to construct broader mea- 
sures of FDI. For each building block, there is an estimate of the value from 
the point of view of US.  parents as of the end of  1989. 
To avoid the special problems of comparing bank assets and liabilities with 
those of other types of businesses, this analysis is limited to nonbank affiliates 
of nonbank U.S. corporate parents. Similarly, in order to focus on foreign in- 
vestments in which the U.S. parent has an unambiguous controlling interest, 
the analysis is limited to majority-owned nonbank affiliates of U.S. nonbank 
parents.’ 
These calculations are based on data from the  1989 benchmark  survey of 
7. The restrictions to nonbank firms and to those with majority ownership by  the U.S. parent 
together reduce the measured  stock of U.S.-owned FDI (according to the balance-of-payments 
measure) by  approximately  18 percent. All U.S. FDI  had  a value (according to the balance-of- 
payments measure) in  1989 of $553 billion, while the corresponding figure for majority-owned 
nonbank affiliates was $452 billion. Both figures are estimates of current (1989 dollar) cost values. 47  Outbound FDI  and Domestic Capital 
U.S. investment abroad reported in the Survey of Current Business (US. De- 
partment of Commerce 1991). Although the benchmark survey data report the 
current dollar values of the debts of foreign affiliates,s the value of assets and 
therefore the value of equity is stated only as historic cost values. The value of 
original equity investments and of retained earnings must therefore be adjusted 
for past price changes to calculate the corresponding current cost values. 
In  the absence of  the necessary detail on annual investment flows, I have 
done so by  using the historic cost and current cost values for the total equity 
of  all U.S. FDI (not just majority-owned nonbank affiliates of  nonbank par- 
ents) that are published by  the Department of Commerce. At year-end 1989, 
the total value of all U.S. FDI abroad9 was $553 billion at current cost (1989 
dollars) and  $370 billion  at  historic cost  (U.S. Department of  Commerce 
1992). Since the debt component of this balance-of-payments measure of the 
stock of  FDI was $24 billion, the corresponding equity amounts were $529 
billion at current cost and $346 billion at historic cost, a ratio of  1  S3. Despite 
the obvious limitations of  using a single ratio for both initial equity invest- 
ments and subsequent retained earnings, this ratio will be used to adjust all 
historic cost equity values in the 1989 benchmark survey to the corresponding 
current cost estimates. 
I turn now to an analysis of the different concepts of the FDI in the nonbank 
affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents. The narrowest definition of FDI is the net 
external finance from the U.S.  parent to the foreign afiliate. This external fi- 
nance at year-end 1989 consisted of $202 billion of initial equity investments 
of U.S. parents (at current cost)Io  and $25 billion of net debt provided by those 
same parents.” 
1. Net External finance from U.S. parents  $227 billion 
($202 billion) 
($25 billion) 
la. Equity from U.S. parents 
Ib. Net debt from U.S. parents 
A small amount of  additional equity investment and credit is extended to 
these overseas affiliates by  other U.S. investors and creditors. The equity in- 
vested in majority-owned businesses by American companies other than the 
parent company is very small, only a cumulative $1 billion. American creditors 
other than the parent firm provided credit of $22 billion.I2 
8. The foreign debt is translated into US.  dollars at current exchange rates but is not adjusted 
for changes in value due to changes in interest rates since the debt was issued. 
9. This is the “balance-of-payments’’ measure of FDI. It is the sum of the initial equity invest- 
ments of U.S. parents, the subsequent retained earnings, and any net debt from US.  parents to 
their foreign affiliates. 
10. The historic cost number reported in the 1989 benchmark survey (US. Department of Com- 
merce 1991, table III.C.1) is $132 billion. Multiplying this by the factor 1.53 produces the current 
cost estimate of $202 billion. 
11. The gross debt from U.S. parents to their foreign affiliates was $84 billion. This was offset 
in large part by  $59 billion of credit from affiliates to parents, leaving a net debt of affiliates to 
parents of $25 billion. The balance-of-payments measure of FDI includes only the net debt, and I 
follow that procedure in the current analysis. 
12. The credit from the U.S. parent as well as from other U.S. sources includes trade credit as 
well as other forms of credit. 48  Martin Feldstein 
2. External finance from other U.S. sources  $23 billion 
($1 billion) 
($22 billion) 
2a. Equity from other U.S. investors 
2b. Debt from other U.S. sources 
The external finance from U.S.  sources is substantially augmented by equity 
and debt from foreign sources. Even among those affiliates that are majority 
owned by  their U.S. parents, foreign sources invested equity of $92 billion at 
current cod3  and foreign creditors provided $567 bi1li0n.I~ 
3. External finance from foreign sources  $659 billion 
($92 billion) 
($567 billion) 
3a. Equity from foreign sources 
3b. Debt from foreign sources 
The final source of capital in the foreign affiliates is the retained earnings 
that were reinvested after paying dividends to parents and others. The  1989 
current cost estimate for the accumulated value of these retained earnings was 
$328 billion. Dividing this aggregate among the three classes of investors in 
proportion to their historic cost values of retained earnings implies: 




4a. Share of U.S. parents 
4b. Share of  other U.S. investors 
4c. Share of foreign equity investors 
With  these building blocks,  it  is  possible to  define three  progressively 
broader  concepts  of  outbound FDI. The  first  is  the  net  external  jinance 
from U.S. sources. This is the sum of  amounts 1 and 2 above, or $250 bil- 
lion. 
The second measure of  U.S. FDI adds the value of  the retained earnings 
of foreign affiliates attributable to U.S. investors (the sum of  amounts 4a and 
4b,  or  $226  billion)  to  the  net  external  finance  from  U.S.  parents  and 
other US. sources. This netjinance from US.  sourcesI5 had a value of $476 
billion. 
The third natural definition is the value of the assets in the foreign affiliate, 
regardless of who finances those assets and of  whether the finance is by debt 
or equity. This definition, the value of assets of US.  foreign affiliates, is the 
sum of the four building blocks, or $1,237 billion. 
The three concepts and the associated magnitudes are shown in table 2.1. 
13. This current dollar figure is based on the historic cost value of $60 billion. 
14. The 1989 benchmark survey reports that the total liabilities of the majority-owned nonbank 
affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents was $673 billion. This included current liability and long-term 
debt of $562 billion and “other liabilities” (including deferred taxes of the subsidiary) of  $1  11 
billion. Subtracting the $106 billion of gross debt provided by US.  parents and other US.  sources 
(i.e., the sum of $25 billion of  net debt from parents, $59 billion of offsetting debt from affiliates 
to parents that is counted as part of the gross debt of the affiliates, and $22 billion of debt from 
other U.S. sources) leaves a balance of $567 billion of debt supplied by foreign sources. 
15. This exceeds the official balance-of-payments definition of the stock of U.S. foreign invest- 
ment by including the value of the equity and debt of  U.S. investors and creditors who are not 
parents of  the foreign affiliates. 49  Outbound FDI  and  Domestic Capital 
Table 2.1  Alternative Measures of FDI 
Concept of FDI  Value at Year-End  1989 
1.  Net external finance from US. sources  $  250 billion 
2. Net finance from US.  sources  $  476 billion 
3. Value of assets of U.S. foreign affiliates  $1,237 billion 
(1 + 2) 
(1 +2+4a+4b) 
(1 + 2 + 3 + 4) 
Nore: All values are adjusted to current cost in 1989 dollars. 
2.2  Displacement Effect of Outbound Direct Investment: Partial 
Equilibrium versus General Equilibrium Analysis 
How does the decision of  an American  firm to invest abroad in a foreign 
subsidiary affect the total amount of  investment in the United States? Despite 
the widespread interest in this question, there has been no formal analysis or 
empirical investigation of the general equilibrium effect of outbound FDI on 
domestic investment. 
2.2.1  Behavior of Individual Firms 
The common popular discussion of this issue treats it as a partial equilibrium 
question of where corporate production will occur. As noted above, opponents 
of outbound FDI argue that such investment reduces domestic production by 
substituting for exports, while defenders of outbound FDI argue that overseas 
subsidiaries increase the market for U.S. exports and therefore increase pro- 
duction in the United States. There are undoubtedly examples of both possibili- 
ties in actual practice. These countervailing effects may explain why the very 
careful study of  individual multinational  firms by  Stevens and Lipsey (1992) 
failed to find any significant effects of overseas production on domestic exports 
and investment.  I6 
An alternative partial equilibrium analysis would start with the corporate 
financial decisions and ask whether a firm that invests more abroad will invest 
less at home. In the simplest textbook version of the investment decision, the 
firm can borrow as much as it wants at a fixed interest rate and therefore invests 
until  the marginal product  of capital equals that rate of interest.  In such an 
economy, borrowing  to finance overseas investment does not alter the firm’s 
funds available for domestic investment. 
Actual corporate experience is very far from these textbook  models. The 
following simplified version of corporate capital budgeting shows how a firm’s 
decision to invest abroad could reduce its domestic investment. In this view, 
16. Similar evidence that outbound FDI is not associated with export displacement is reported 
in Blomstrom et al. (1988) and in Lipsey and Weiss (1981, 1984). 50  Martin Feldstein 
the company starts with a fixed amount of after-tax profits and a dividend pay- 
out that its shareholders expect. There is some but very  little room to vary 
dividends from the expected amount. The combination of the retained earnings 
(after this dividend payout) and the company’s desired debt-to-capital ratio de- 
termines the amount that the company can borrow and therefore the firm’s total 
funds available for capital investments.”  Since this capital budget calculation 
is done for the multinational corporation as a whole rather than for individual 
subsidiaries, the result is a capital budget for the entire corporation. Any use 
of that capital  abroad reduces  the amount  of  capital  available for domestic 
investment within the firm.I8 
However, as the analysis of  section 2.1 indicated,  much of the capital in- 
vested in U.S. affiliates overseas is raised abroad. It is clear that the share of 
foreign-source debt and equity in the U.S. foreign affiliates is far greater than 
the share of such foreign-source debt and equity in the financing of the domes- 
tic U.S. industry. This reflects the fact that most American firms are more likely 
to borrow  abroad to finance overseas assets than to finance domestic assets. 
The reason for this is unclear. It may reflect a desire to hedge foreign currency 
profits with foreign currency debt, an ability to borrow more cheaply when 
collateral is available, or other aspects of the risk and return of financing behav- 
ior. This segmentation of  borrowing may be a form of  suboptimal behavior 
similar to the widely observed failure of portfolio managers to diversify in- 
vestment. 
Similarly, American firms are more likely to seek foreign joint-venture part- 
ners for overseas subsidiaries (in order to get market access or other benefits 
of having a local partner) than they are to seek such equity investors here in the 
United States. The foreign equity investor is also likely to regard such direct 
investment as a joint-venture partner within its own country as less risky than 
investing in the United States. 
In short, even if outbound FDI substitutes for other investments within the 
firm’s capital budget, more of the funds to finance that outbound FDI are likely 
to come from foreign sources than would be the case for domestic investment. 
2.2.2  Macroeconomic General Equilibrium Effects 
To assess the net impact of outbound FDI on total investment in the United 
States it is important to look beyond the partial equilibrium analysis of individ- 
ual firms. The net impact of outbound FDI depends on the extent to which that 
17. The company could of  course modify this by  new  equity issues, share repurchases, and 
divestitures, but these should be seen as unusual events rather than as part of the annual capital 
budgeting process. 
18. Stevens and Lipsey (1992)  investigate the financial interdependence between foreign invest- 
ment and domestic investment over time in  a sample of  U.S. multinational firms  and find that 
overseas investment does reduce domestic investment through this channel. Their formal model 
lies between the two extremes described in  the current text:  firms do not have a fixed debt-to- 
capital ratio, but the cost of funds is a function of that ratio. 51  Outbound FDI and Domestic Capital 
outbound FDI changes the aggregate net outflow of  capital from the United 
States, including net portfolio investment as well as net direct investment. 
In a world of perfect capital mobility in which the total pool of world savings 
moves to finance those investments with the highest risk-adjusted rates of re- 
turn, an increase in U.S. direct investment abroad need not have any effect on 
the U.S.  capital stock. Funds would automatically flow in to finance domestic 
U.S. investments that earn the required rate of return. 
But although the integration of global capital markets appears to be increas- 
ing, we are still a long way from the textbook model of perfect capital-market 
integration. Gross international capital flows are large, but sustained net flows 
are relatively  small. As Charles Horioka  and I showed nearly  15 years ago 
(Feldstein and Horioka  1980), a nation’s savings tend to be  invested  in the 
country where they originate.I9  The “saving retention coefficient” (the fraction 
of a marginal dollar of saving that is invested domestically) is estimated to be 
between 0.8 and 0.9 on average for the OECD countries. This is dramatically 
different from the world of perfect capital mobility in which a nation’s rate of 
investment  would  not depend on its saving rate  and therefore in which the 
saving retention coefficient would be zero. 
Paradoxically, the extreme no-net-capital-flow  case (a saving retention coef- 
ficient of  1  .O that is uninfluenced by the volume of  outbound or inbound FDI) 
has the same implication in the current context as the perfect capital mobility 
case: an outflow of  direct investment does not change the amount of net do- 
mestic investment. Any net outflow of FDI in this case would be offset by a 
reduction in outbound portfolio investment or an increase in inbound portfolio 
investment. The previous estimates of the Feldstein-Horioka-type  investment- 
saving equations did not explicitly test whether the amount of domestic invest- 
ment is influenced by the outbound or inbound FDI. That is the subject of the 
next two sections. 
A more likely possibility  is that the Feldstein-Horioka  relation applies to 
portfolio investment rather than to direct investment. In the extreme case, an 
extra dollar of national saving would remain in domestic portfolio assets unless 
it is used by a multinational corporation to finance a cross-border direct invest- 
ment. Such an outbound FDI would reduce the funds available for domestic 
investment by  an equal amount, as the above corporate budget example sug- 
gests. If the portfolio investments were completely  segmented into national 
markets in this way, the effect of the outbound FDI on domestically available 
funds would not be offset by any international flow of portfolio capital and the 
aggregate domestic investment  would be reduced by the full amount of the 
direct investment outflow. 
19. This fact has since been replicated many times. See Frankel (1991) and Mussa and Goldstein 
(1993) for discussions of this literature and comments on the reasons why savings remain at home 
even in a world capital market that appears to be quite closely linked and very active. See also 
Baxter and Crucini (1993) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991). 52  Martin Feldstein 
The evidence in the next two sections supports the idea that FDI transfers 
capital across borders with very little offsetting net portfolio investment. More 
specifically, the evidence indicates that each dollar of outbound FDI reduces 
domestic investment by approximately one dollar. 
2.3  Estimates of the Effects of  FDI on Domestic Investment 
The estimates presented in this section are an extension of earlier work re- 
ported in a number of papers beginning with Feldstein and Horioka (1980).20 
The basic Feldstein-Horioka specification relates the ratio of  gross domestic 
investment to GDP to the ratio of gross national saving to GDP. Since these 
ratios are calculated as decade averages, the analysis relates to sustained differ- 
ences among countries rather than year-to-year changes. The specification as- 
sumes that the national differences in saving determine national differences 
in investment rather than the reverse. Since these specification issues have 
been discussed extensively in previous articles,2L  I will not comment on them 
here. 
The innovation in the current study is to add data on inbound and outbound 
FDI to the previous bivariate specification. The simplest form of the resulting 
equation is 
GDVGDP = u + b (GNS/GDP) + c [(FDI-out)/GDP] 
+ d [(FDI-in)/GDP] + u, 
where GDI is gross domestic investment, GNS is gross national saving, GDP 
is gross domestic product, the two types of FDI are denoted FDI-out and FDI- 
in, and u is a stochastic disturbance. The individual variables in the numerator 
and denominator of each ratio are flows at annual rates denominated in current 
dollars in national currencies. The ratios are decade averages of annual ratios 
for each country. More general specifications with additional variables are dis- 
cussed in section 2.4. 
By definition, GDI includes only the investment done within the geographic 
boundaries of the home country. Investment by  foreign affiliates of  the home 
country’s  multinationals  are  excluded.  Investment  within  the  geographic 
boundaries of  the home country that is done by  the local affiliates of foreign 
multinationals is included in GDI. The GNS figures include the saving in the 
form of  retained earnings of  foreign affiliates of  the home country’s multi- 
nationals. The FDI  values are based on  the balance-of-payments definition 
and  refer  to  all  foreign  affiliates,  not  just  majority-owned  or  nonbank 
affiliates. These data are not ideal, but they are the best data available for this 
study. 
20. See Frankel (1991) and Mussa and Goldstein (1993) for summaries of  this literature. 
21. See Feldstein (1983) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) as well as the references cited in 
n. 20. 53  Outbound FDI and Domestic Capital 
Table 2.2  Effects of National Saving and FDI on Domestic Investment 
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0.84  -1.73 
(0.10)  (0.90) 
0.74  -1.65 
(0.12)  (0.69) 
0.77  -1.58 
(0.07)  (0.47) 
0.76  -1.42 
(0.12)  (0.46) 
0.59  -1.87 
(0.23)  (0.63) 
0.66  -  1.71 




0.80  0.87 
0.47  0.74 
(0.86) 
0.59  0.84 
(0.62) 
2.18  0.90 
(0.63) 
2.5 1  0.67 
( 1.09) 
2.38  0.82 
(0.59) 
(1.11) 
‘Indicates whether the FDI variables include or exclude the retained earnings of  the foreign affil- 
iates. 
Although the OECD produces consistent data on GDI, GNS, and GDP, there 
are no official OECD data on FDI. The data on FDI come from the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund.22  The limited availability of  data on FDI restricts the 
sample to 18 of the 24 OECD countries for the decade of the 1980s and 15 of 
those countries for the decade of the 1970s. This section presents separate re- 
sults for both samples as well as for a pooled sample of 33 observations. For 
all of these countries it is possible to obtain estimates of FDI excluding retained 
earnings (RE). It is also possible to obtain the amount of retained earnings of 
these foreign affiliates for 9 of  the countries during the decade of the 1970s 
and  10 of  the countries during the decade of  the 1980s. Estimates are also 
presented for these smaller samples. 
The first three equations presented in table 2.2 are the standard investment- 
savings relation without FDI. The estimated savings retention coefficients for 
this sample of OECD countries are 0.87 (s.e. = 0.10) for the 1970s and 0.74 
(s.e. = 0.12) for the 1980s, very similar to the estimates obtained with the 
larger samples of OECD countries in past research. The savings retention coef- 
ficient for the pooled data is 0.80 (s.e. = 0.07) and lies between the two indi- 
vidual decade estimates. 
In equation (4) of table 2.2, the coefficient of the FDI-out variable is -  1.73 
22. These data are published  in the Balance of  Payments Yearbook. The current  study uses 
updated unpublished data. The actual data are presented in the appendix to this paper. 54  Martin Feldstein 
(s.e. = 0.90) and the coefficient of  the FDI-in variable is 0.80 (s.e. = 1.11). 
Adding these two FDI variables to the traditional saving-investment equation 
leaves the estimated savings retention coefficient virtually unchanged at 0.84 
(s.e. = 0.10). 
The coefficient of  the FDI-out variable, which is of primary interest in the 
current analysis, is quite stable in the different time periods and specifications. 
It is always negative, implying that the aggregate level of domestic investment 
in a country declines when outbound FDI increases. Since this effect is condi- 
tional on given levels of national saving and inbound FDI, it implies that other 
international capital flows (inbound and outbound portfolio investment and 
borrowing) do not adjust to offset the direct effect of outbound FDI on domes- 
tic investment. The coefficient of outbound FDI is -  1.73 (s.e. = 0.62) in the 
1970s and -1.65  (s.e. = 0.69) in the 1980s when FDI is defined as a cross- 
border capital transfer (i.e., excluding retained earnings of the foreign affili- 
ates). Adding the retained earnings of  foreign affiliates (eq. [7]) leaves the 
coefficient for 1970 essentially unchanged (- 1.42 with s.e. = 0.40) and in- 
creases the absolute size of  the  1980 coefficient only slightly (- 1.87 with 
s.e. = 0.63). 
It would of course be desirable to distinguish the response of domestic in- 
vestment to outbound cross-border FDI flows from the response of domestic 
investment to the retained earnings of  the  foreign affiliates. Unfortunately, 
there are too few observations to make such an estimate. Attempts to use the 
samples corresponding to equations (7)-(9)  to look at the RE variable sepa- 
rately (in addition to the other variables already in those equations) results in 
almost no residual degrees of  freedom and therefore leads to very unstable 
coefficient estimates with very large standard errors. It is not possible to deter- 
mine statistically whether a one-dollar increase in GNS due to an increase in 
the RE of foreign affiliates has the same impact on GDI as a one-dollar rise in 
GNS due to domestic savings.23  Similarly, when outbound FDI is defined to 
include the retained earnings of foreign affiliates (eqs. [7]-[9]),  it is not clear 
whether the reaction to the cross-border FDI flow is the same as the reaction 
to FDI-out that is achieved without a cross-border flow by  an increase in the 
retained earnings of the affiliate. 
The reaction of domestic home-country investment to a dollar of dividends 
that is repatriated by the subsidiary to the parent company is ambiguous a pri- 
ori as well. Although the direct effect of the dividend repatriation would be to 
add to the domestic capital stock, this could be offset to the extent that the 
dividend induces a reduction in inbound portfolio investment or an increase in 
outbound direct or portfolio investment. Since the econometric evidence can- 
not resolve this ambiguity, section 2.5 examines the implications of the two 
alternative extreme assumptions that subsidiary retained earnings reduce do- 
23. Recall that gross national saving includes the retained earnings of foreign affiliates. 55  Outbound FDI and Domestic Capital 
mestic (home-country) investment dollar for dollar and, alternatively, that they 
do not affect domestic investment at all. 
2.4  Additional Variables and Simultaneity Problems 
The interpretation of the coefficients in table 2.2 is clouded by the fact that 
the saving rate and the two FDI ratios are endogenous variables in the overall 
economic system. In particular, the levels of  inbound and outbound FDI are 
likely to be correlated with variables that favor higher domestic rates of invest- 
ment. A country that offers a “good environment” for domestic investment is 
also likely to attract more inbound FDI and may also experience less outbound 
FDI. This section shows that this problem of missing variables does indeed 
bias the coefficients shown in section 2.3, increasing the absolute size of both 
the FDI-out and FDI-in coefficients. 
The results in this section are thus quite different from the earlier studies 
of potential bias in the estimated savings retention coefficient in the simpler 
Feldstein-Horioka specification. Since it is certainly possible that some of the 
same factors that cause a country to have a higher saving rate might also cause 
it to have a higher investment rate, Feldstein and Bacchetta (199 1) also esti- 
mated the basic specification by an instrumental variable (IV) estimation pro- 
cedure using demographic characteristics and social security variables as in- 
struments for the national saving rate. Although the relatively small sample of 
fewer than two dozen countries limits the relevance of the consistency property 
of  IV estimation, the similarity of the OLS and IV estimates provides some 
reassurance that the potential endogeneity of the savings rate is not a source of 
significant bias. Further support for the assumption that long-term intercountry 
differences in saving cause long-term differences in investment (rather than 
the reverse or a simultaneous equations relation) is obtained by dividing na- 
tional saving into private saving and government saving and noting that both 
components of national  saving have essentially the same effect on domestic 
investment in  a generalized Feldstein-Horioka specification  (Feldstein  and 
Bacchetta 1991). 
Although it would be desirable to reestimate the equations in table 2.2 using 
an IV approach, I have been unable to find any variables that would be satisfac- 
tory instruments. I decided therefore to pursue a different approach to reducing 
the possible bias in the estimated FDI coefficients by expanding the specifica- 
tion of  the investment equation to include additional determinants of invest- 
ment that might also be correlated with either or both of the FDI variables. 
Although some bias might remain even in this specification because not all 
possible variables are included, this method is preferable to using an IV esti- 
mation procedure with a very small sample and very inadequate instruments. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the results of these more general specifications. The 
evidence confirms that outbound FDI does reduce domestic investment, but the 56  Martin Feldstein 
Table 2.3  Impact of Additional Variables on the Estimated Effect of FDI 
on Domestic Investment 
Equation  Period  RE  N  GNS  FDI-Out  FDI-In  Other Variables  Adjusted R’ 
Pooled  No  33 
Pooled  No  33 
1970s  No  15 
1970s  No  15 
1980s  No  18 
1980s  No  18 
Pooled  Yes  19 
Pooled  Yes  19 



































-  1.36 
-  1.37 
0.16  E**, SIZE**, INF**, GRO 
(0.50) 
-0.04  E**, SIZE**, INF*, INT** 
(.M) 
-0.03  E, SIZE*, INF*, GRO 
(1.21) 
0.00  E, SIZE*, INF, INT 
(1.16) 
-0.19  E**, SIZE**, INF**, GRO 
(0.57) 
-0.20  E**, SIZE**, INF*, INT 
(0.54) 
1.41  E, SIZE**, INF, GRO 
(0.58) 
0.94  E*, SIZE**, INF, INT* 
(0.54) 











Nore: Each equation also contains a constant term. The FDI-in and FDI-out variables exclude retained 
earnings in eqs. (1)-(6)  and include retained earnings in eqs. (7)-(9).  See text for definitions of “other vari- 
ables.’’ 
coefficients are now absolutely smaller, indicating that the previously omitted 
variables  were  common  factors  that  affected  FDI-out  and GDI in  similar 
ways.24 
For example, equation  (1) of table 2.3 (which is estimated for the pooled 
sample of 33 country-decade observations) includes four variables in addition 
to the saving rate and FDI variables: (1) a dummy variable indicating whether 
the country is in Europe (E), (2) the size of  the country as measured by  its 
average population  during the  decade (SIZE), (3) the average inflation  rate 
during the decade (INF), and (4) the average growth rate of GDP during the 
decade (GRO). These variables are listed as “other variables” in the description 
of  equation (1). Those other variables with a t-statistic  between  1 and 2 are 
marked with an asterisk, while those with a t-statistic in excess of 2 are marked 
with two asterisks. Thus E, SIZE, and INF have t-statistics greater than 2, while 
GRO is not statistically significant. In this specification, the coefficient of FDI- 
out is -  1.17 with a standard error of 0.47. 
24.  The coefficients of  FDI-in change even more substantially and  are now insignificant in 
every case, indicating that the inflow of  FDI  does not appear to alter the domestic investment 
rate. Presumably the capital inflow in the form of inbound FDI substitutes for inbound portfolio 
investment or induces other balancing transactions. 57  Outbound FDI and Domestic Capital 
Equation (2)  adds the average short-term interest rate (INT) and deletes the 
insignificant growth variable. This specification, which has  the highest ad- 
justed R2 of all the variable combinations that I have examined, also suggests 
that the coefficient of  FDI-out is approximately -1,  i.e., that each dollar of 
FDI-out reduces GDI by about one dollar. 
The next four equations in table 2.3 are for the individual decades. The abso- 
lute values of the coefficient of FDI-out are slightly smaller than 1 in each of 
these specifications. The large standard errors in these equations should be 
interpreted in the context of the smaller samples for individual decades (only 
15 observations for the  1970s and 18 observations for the 1980s) which, to- 
gether with the additional variables, leave as few as seven residual degrees of 
freedom. But taken together with the pooled data of equations (1) and (2)  and 
the separate decade estimates for the simpler specifications in table 2.2, it 
seems most appropriate to conclude that each dollar of  cross-border FDI-out 
reduces domestic investment by approximately one dollar. 
The FDI variables reported in equations (1)-(6) of table 2.3 all measure FDI 
excluding retained earnings. Although  eliminating the eight countries that 
do not  provide  information on retained earnings would  leave  too  small  a 
sample of observations for either decade alone, it is possible to use the pooled 
sample for  19 observations for the two  decades. The results are shown in 
equations (7),  (X), and (9). The first two of  these repeat the two  specifica- 
tions of  equations (1)-(6), while equation (9) is the specification with  the 
highest adjusted R2 when the FDI variables are defined to include retained 
earnings. 
The coefficients are similar in all three specifications. The estimated effect 
of  FDI-out is slightly larger in absolute size than in the pooled estimates of 
equations (1) and (2)  but, given the small sample and large standard errors, 
is not significantly different from -  1.0. The major difference from the other 
equations in table 2.3 is that the coefficient of  the FDI-in variable rises to 
approximately 1 .O  and becomes nearly twice its standard error. This implies 
that the retained earnings of foreign affiliates in a given host country, like other 
forms of  domestic saving in that country, increase domestic investment in that 
host country. 
More generally, the evidence in this section implies that outflows of  FDI 
reduce domestic investment on a dollar-for-dollar basis and that this reduction 
is not offset by an international shift in portfolio investment. This is consistent 
with a view that the Feldstein-Horioka segmentation of capital markets applies 
to portfolio investment and that direct investment circumvents this barrier to 
capital mobility. Similarly, FDI induces U.S. firms to use much more foreign 
debt and equity finance in their majority-owned foreign affiliates than they 
would use for domestic investments. In that way,  the financing of  FDI also 
makes available the advantages of  foreign portfolio financing in a way  that 
would not occur without the direct investment. 58  Martin Feldstein 
2.5  Effect of Outbound FDI on Foreign Assets and the Domestic 
Capital Stock 
By combining the parameter estimates of sections 2.3 and 2.4 with the evi- 
dence on the sources of  capital of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals in 
section 2.2 it is possible to answer the fundamental question of how much the 
U.S. domestic capital stock declines per dollar of additional capital in the for- 
eign affiliates of U.S. multinationals. 
The answer to this question depends on how that foreign affiliate capital is 
financed. The parameter estimates of sections 2.3 and 2.4 imply that on average 
within the OECD each dollar of cross-border external finance reduces domes- 
tic investment by one dollar. The data analyzed in section 2.2 show that approx- 
imately 20 cents of each dollar of the existing U.S. foreign affiliate capital is 
financed by such a cross-border flow of capital from the United States. Of the 
remainder,  18 cents comes from the  U.S.  share of retained earnings  of  the 
foreign affiliate and 62 cents comes from foreign debt and equity sources. 
Before considering the implication of this average financing mix, I will con- 
sider two simpler cases. 
2.5.1  Pure Parent Finance 
Consider first the  simplest case in which the incremental foreign affiliate 
capital is financed  exclusively by the U.S.  parent  with no foreign equity or 
debt. If the U.S. general equilibrium response to cross-border capital outflows 
is similar to the average OECD response, each dollar of parent-to-affiliate  fi- 
nance reduces the U.S. domestic capital stock by one dollar. In  this extreme 
case, each dollar of  increased capital in the foreign affiliate reduces the U.S. 
domestic capital stock by one dollar. 
2.5.2  Leveraged Retained Earnings Finance 
As a second and much more common case, consider the foreign affiliate that 
uses retained earnings to finance an incremental investment and that combines 
those foreign retained earnings with local debt. The sources of financing per 
unit of incremental capital in the subsidiary can be defined as: 
s = 
s*  = 
b* = 
the retained earnings of the subsidiary attributable to the U.S. parent 
the  retained  earnings  of  the  subsidiary  attributable  to non-U.S. 
the debt supplied by non-U.S. creditors. 
and other U.S. equity investors; 
sources; and 
By assumption, in this case s + s* + b*  = 1. 
The alternative to investing the retained earnings of the subsidiary would be 
to distribute them as dividends to the  U.S.  and foreign equity  owners. The 
econometric analysis of sections 2.3 and 2.4 was not able to measure the aver- 59  Outbound FDI and Domestic Capital 
age OECD response to changes in retained earnings or dividend repatriations. 
The effect on domestic capital formation in the home country of the subsid- 
iary’s choice between retaining earnings and repatriating those earnings as div- 
idends cannot be settled by a priori analysis either. Consider therefore the alter- 
native possibilities. If  a dollar of  repatriated dividends would add one dollar 
to the U.S. gross domestic investment, an additional dollar of  foreign affili- 
ate capital financed with leveraged retained earnings reduces the U.S. capital 
stock by  s < 1 dollars. To  the extent that the repatriation of  retained earn- 
ings displaces other financial capital inflows or  increases financial capital 
outflows, the depressing effect on the U.S. capital stock would be  smaller 
than s. 
The analysis of  section 2.1  shows that the retained earnings attributable to 
U.S. investors (corresponding to s in the current calculation) were $226 billion 
in  1989, that the retained earnings attributable to foreign investors was $102 
billion, and that the debt from foreign sources was $567 billion. If the relative 
magnitudes of  these three financing sources are used to approximate the fi- 
nancing  of  the  leveraged  retained  earnings  investment,  we  obtain  s  = 
226/895 = 0.25. With these assumptions, an additional dollar of foreign affili- 
ate capital financed with leveraged retained earnings reduces the U.S. capital 
stock by  25 cents. This is an upper limit of  the plausible range because it is 
based on the assumption that any retained earnings that are not invested by the 
foreign subsidiary would otherwise add dollar for dollar to the U.S. capital 
stock. 
2.5.3  Average Financing 
The observed aggregate financing mix described in section 2.1 reflects both 
new  equity and debt transfers from parents to affiliates and the subsequent 
reinvestment of  retained earnings. Both types of  investments are leveraged 
with foreign debt. While individual investments will use different financing 
mixes, the overall financing mix may remain relatively unchanged if the mix 
of new investment and reinvestment continues to be about the same.25 
To analyze this overall average financing case, the three sources of financing 





the external equity capital provided by  the U.S. parent and other 
the external equity capital provided by non-U.S. sources; and 
the debt supplied by the U.S. parent and other U.S. creditors. 
U.S. investors; 
25. It would be desirable to compare the composition of financing of  U.S. foreign affiliates in 
the 1989 benchmark survey with the financing composition in earlier studies. 60  Martin Feldstein 
The econometric results of  section 2.3 and 2.4 imply that each dollar of 
cross-border equity and debt (e  and b in the current notation) reduces domestic 
investment by one dollar. If we assume also that each dollar of foreign affiliate 
retained earnings that is not invested in the affiliate would otherwise be repatri- 
ated and would add dollar for dollar to domestic investment in the United 
States, an additional dollar of foreign affiliate capital financed with the ob- 
served average mix of financing sources would reduce the US. capital stock 
by e + b + s < 1  dollars. Once again this is an upper limit because the repatria- 
tion of subsidiary retained earnings may not increase domestic investment dol- 
lar for dollar. 
The analysis of section 2.1 showed that, of the $1,237 billion of total assets, 
the external equity finance from U.S. sources was $203 billion, the debt from 
U.S. parents and other U.S.  creditors was $47 billion, and the share of retained 
earnings attributable to U.S. parents and other investors was $226 billion. In 
this case, e  + b = 0.20 and e  + b + s  = 0.38. If  each dollar of  retained 
earnings would otherwise be repatriated and add one dollar to domestic invest- 
ment, each dollar of foreign affiliate investment financed by this average mix 
of sources reduces the U.S. capital stock by 0.38 dollars. At the other extreme, 
if the inflow of repatriated earnings would only displace some other portfolio 
inflow or induce a portfolio outflow, each dollar of foreign affiliate investment 
financed by this average mix of sources reduces the US. capital stock by  only 
0.20 dollars. 
Although individual investments will  use  different financing mixes,  this 
overall financing case is probably the best indication of how the financing of 
the foreign affiliate capital stock evolves. If  so, it implies that each dollar of 
displaced domestic capital in the United States adds between $2.60 and $5.00 
to the capital stock of U.S. foreign affiliates. 
This relation between forgone domestic investment and the increase in the 
capital stock of U.S. foreign affiliates is important for assessing the impact of 
outbound FDI on the national income of the United States. The effect of out- 
bound U.S. FDI on U.S. national income depends on the rate of return earned 
on such investments, the cost of the foreign capital, and the amount of taxes 
paid to the foreign government. Although U.S. firms that invest abroad presum- 
ably select the allocation of  capital that maximizes the present value of  the 
firms’ after-tax profits, the existence of  foreign taxes implies that their deci- 
sions will not in general maximize U.S. national income. The firm may  be 
indifferent between paying taxes to the U.S. government and a foreign govern- 
ment, but only the former remains a part of  U.S. national income. An  evalua- 
tion of  whether the outbound U.S. FDI increases or decreases U.S. national 
income requires balancing the tax losses to foreign governments against the 
advantage of the increased use of foreign-source capital that accompanies FDI. 
That analysis is the subject of a separate study (Feldstein 1994). 61  Outbound FDI and Domestic Capital 
Appendix 
Table 2A.1  Decade Averages of Investment, Saving, and FDI Ratios: 1970-79 
Ratios to GDP 
Outbound 
Country  GDI  GNS  FDI" 
Australia  0.250  0.238  0.001 
Austria  0.286  0.278  0.001 
BelgiumlLuxembourg  0.227  0.232  0.007 
Canada  0.240  0.224  0.008 
Finland  0.285  0.265  0.002 
France  0.255  0.259  0.003 
Germany  0.234  0.244  0.005 
Italy  0.258  0.260  0.002 
Japan  0.345  0.353  0.003 
Netherlands  0.234  0.246  0.018 
New Zealand  0.260  0.217  0.001 
Spain  0.266  0.251  0.001 
Sweden  0.216  0.209  0.006 
United Kingdom  0.199  0.180  0.010 




















































Note: n.a. = not available. 
'Excludes retained earnings (RE). 
Table 2A.2  Decade Averages of Investment, Saving, and FDI Ratios: 1980-90 
Ratios to GDP 
Outbound  Inbound  Outbound  Inbound 











































































































n.a 62  Martin Feldstein 
Table 2A.2  (continued) 
Ratios to GDP 
Outbound  Inbound  Outbound  Inbound 
Country  GDI  GNS  FDI”  FDP  RE  RE 
Sweden  0.188  0.169  0.020  0.004  0.005  0.001 
United Kingdom  0.176  0.166  0.015  0.012  0.012  0.006 
United States  0.179  0.163  0.000  0.008  0.003  0.000 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
“Excludes  retained earnings. 
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Comment  Kenneth A. Froot 
Over a decade ago, Feldstein posed a substantial puzzle to international econo- 
mists. In  his paper with Charles Horioka (Feldstein and Horioka 1980), he 
argued that an increase in the national savings rate resulted in a one-for-one 
increase in investment. Notwithstanding economists’ views about the ease with 
which capital flows across borders, savings and investment behave as though 
there is no international capital mobility. This conclusion has been subjected 
to much further research, but with little change-by  the measure of net asset 
flows, international capital mobility seems surprisingly low. 
In the paper in this volume, Feldstein applies this line of research to foreign 
direct investment (FDI). If the Feldstein-Horioka view of the world is correct, 
then there is little room for net international capital flows-current  accounts 
are effectively fixed. Thus, an increase in FDI outflows from (in this case) the 
United States should result in an increase in capital inflows, and result in no 
overall effect on domestic investment. Furthermore, domestic investment is 
insensitive to FDI flows under complete international capital mobility. As long 
as domestic opportunities are not correlated with FDI, then FDI flows should 
have no influence on the current account or level of domestic investment. 
In contrast to the predictions of these theories, Feldstein finds that each dol- 
lar of FDI outflow (holding fixed gross national savings) results in a one-dollar 
reduction in domestic investment.  This is a striking finding, as it seems to con- 
tradict both the Feldstein-Horioka and perfect-capital-markets views of  the 
world. A similar, although considerably weaker, result seems to hold for U.S. 
inflows of FDI. 
Kenneth A. Froot is professor of  business administration  at Harvard Business School and a 
research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 64  Martin Feldstein 
In this comment, I want to do two things. First, I will argue that some, al- 
though probably not all, of the effect in the paper may be due to measurement 
issues in the data. This implies that a truly exogenous one-dollar increase in 
FDI results in a less-than-one-dollar decrease in domestic investment,  but a 
decrease nonetheless. Second, I want to try to interpret this result in terms of 
the literature that links investment to corporate cash flow. 
To  see the measurement error issue, it is important to note that many capital 
transactions between a foreign affiliate and its U.S. parent can affect both FDI 
and domestic savings. For example, when  an affiliate has retained earnings, 
those earnings are counted as domestic saving and as FDI outflows. Similarly, 
if for tax reasons a firm wants to repatriate a dividend from its foreign affiliate 
in a specific year, yet does not want to reduce the affiliate’s cash resources, it 
would be recorded as both an increase in domestic savings and an FDI outflow. 
One might guess that these transactions have little influence on domestic sav- 
ings, yet they will tend to bias the regression coefficient on FDI outflows to- 
ward that of domestic savings. 
To see this, let us partition  observed domestic  savings into a component 
unrelated to these intracorporate transactions and the transactions themselves: 
(1) 
where So is observed gross national savings, E  is a measure of intracorporate 
transactions which is unrelated to domestic investment, and S is all other do- 
mestic savings. FDI outflows can be decomposed in the same way: 
(2)  FDI,  = FDI + E. 
Next,  suppose that the true Feldstein-Horioka  relationship  between  savings 
and investment is given by 
(3) 
where  IJ. is a random error term. If  we run the regression of investment  on 
observed savings and FDI, we will find the coefficient on FDI, is biased toward 
-p,  even if FDI flows have no effect on domestic investment. The larger the 
portion of FDI volatility contributed by E, the closer to -  p will the estimated 
coefficient on FDI,  be. A further implication of this setup is that when FDI, 
is omitted from the regression, the measurement error affects the estimated 
coefficient on So more severely, causing it to be more severely biased below p. 
The results in tables 2.2 and 2.3  provide some evidence to support this story. 
The coefficients  on saving tend to be higher when FDI,  is not included and 
lower when it is included. Furthermore, the coefficients on FDI,  (for inflows 
as well as outflows) are larger (especially in table 2.3) when retained earnings 
are included in FDI flows. Since retained earnings are an important source of 
the &-measurement error, this is what we would expect. This quick analysis 
suggests that it might be worth taking the time to clean the FDI data of intra- 
So = S + E, 
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corporate transactions. One could, for example, focus on FDI flows from merg- 
ers and acquisitions only to eliminate the potential for this type of bias. 
Having said this, let us take seriously the hypothesis that FDI outflows do 
indeed negatively affect domestic investment. Thus, my second question be- 
comes, How might we rationalize the Feldstein result? That is, why would FDI 
be expected to affect domestic investment, given domestic savings? 
One  explanation  would  rely  on models  of  capital-market imperfections 
which arise from informational asymmetries or agency problems. Specifically, 
these models generate deadweight costs which make it more expensive for 
firms to tap external funds than to use internal funds. One prediction of these 
models is that investment spending by corporations is liquidity constrained, so 
that an increase in corporate liquidity-for  example, corporate savings-re- 
sults in an increase in investment even when holding investment opportunities 
fixed. This follows because the increase in internal funds lowers a firm’s effec- 
tive cost of capital, and therefore raises investment.’ 
In such a world, we might think of domestic saving as proxying for corporate 
and  household  liquidity. This  would  then  help  us  understand  the  original 
Feldstein-Horioka results,  which imply that  increases in saving themselves 
generate increases in investment. Of course, to test this theory more precisely, 
one would want to include an additional variable in the original regression 
of investment on savings: a control for investment opportunities. For public 
corporations, such a control is available in the form of the companies’ stock 
prices (relative to book values). However, for countries it is harder to think of 
an observable indicator of future investment opportunities. 
In spite of the omission of a control for investment opportunities, this model 
can help us understand the results of Feldstein’s paper as well. If the availability 
of internal funds to U.S. firms largely drives their total investment spending, 
then the sum of FDI outflows and domestic investment should be roughly con- 
stant. (This ignores the impacts on domestic investment of foreign firms’ FDI 
inflows, but these can be thought of  as exogenous and separate forces which 
are also driven by the availability of internal funds, i.e., foreign corporate sav- 
ings.) This would imply that increases in FDI decrease one-for-one domestic 
investment. 
Of course, this is an extreme version of the “cash-flow’’  hypothesis. In prac- 
tice, companies do have access to external funds, even if  they are somewhat 
more  expensive. Thus, when  an  FDI opportunity  comes along, it may  not 
crowd out domestic investment one for one, because the firm borrows addi- 
tional funds for the domestic investment from some combination of foreign 
and domestic households. Nevertheless, this suggests that a model of  costly 
external funds can indeed generate results similar to those in the paper. 
1. General references on this literature include Fazani, Hubbard, and Petersen  (1 988). Froot 
and Stein (1991). and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991). 66  Martin Feldstein 
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